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THE EFFECT OF APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY
ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SENTENCING FACTORS AND ELEMENTS OF A
CRIME
Andrew J. Fuchs*
INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey,' the United States
Supreme Court promulgated the bright line rule that -[other than...
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 This holding requires
juries to make many of the determinations affecting a defendant's
sentence that had previously been made by judges. As a result, these
determinations must now be made using the more stringent "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, instead of the "preponderance of the
evidence standard" that judges may use.'
Determinations affecting a defendant's sentence fall into two
categories: elements of a crime and sentencing factors.' An element
is a fact that demands heightened due process protections, namely
that a jury determine its existence using the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof.5 By contrast, sentencing factors undergo a
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Daniel C. Richman for his invaluable insight and guidance, Assistant
United States Attorney Michael Gilbert for helping direct me to this topic, and my
family for their support.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (holding that the New Jersey bias crimes law is
unconstitutional because the judge, rather than the jury, made the determination that
there was bias involved).
2. Id. at 2362-63.
3. See infra notes 5, 7, 27 and accompanying text for further discussion regarding
the distinction between these two standards of proof.
4. See generally Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 (discussing the distinction between
elements and sentencing factors); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)
(concluding that sentencing factors require a different burden of proof than
elements); Richard Singer & Mark D. Knoll, Elements and Sentencing Factors: A
Reassessment of the Alleged Distinction, 12 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 203 (2000)
[hereinafter Singer, Elements].
5. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85; Singer, Elements, supra note 4, at 204; Note,
Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 Harv.
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less stringent fact finding process.' Sentencing factors are
determinations impacting the length of a defendant's sentence that a
judge, rather than a jury, makes using the preponderance of the
evidence standard.' For example, after the jury has already convicted
a defendant, judges routinely decide the existence of such sentencing
factors as narcotics quantity, whether anyone was injured during the
commission of the crime, the extent of victim injury, or whether a
weapon was involved.8 For many years, it has been uncertain
precisely which determinations are sentencing factors and which are
elements.9 The Apprendi decision has now definitively drawn a line"
by defining an element as any fact that would expose a defendant to a
sentence greater than the maximum statutory penalty for the crime
for which the jury convicted him.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi raises the controversial
issue of the fate of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Guidelines"). Currently, judges must use the Guidelines to
determine a specific sentencing range within the greater legislatively
created statutory range.1" Although by its terms, the holding does not
seem to affect the Guidelines, the dissenting Justices in Apprendi and
other commentators disagree, arguing that the decision will
necessarily apply, and will require juries to make every Guidelines
determination that impacts a defendant's sentence. This could require
the total invalidation of the Guidelines. 3 Moreover, if courts apply
Apprendi to the Guidelines, numerous procedural difficulties would
L. Rev. 1093, 1095-96 (1993) [hereinafter Winship on Rough Waters].
6. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
7. See Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not
Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by
Sentencing Factors Rather than Elements of the Offense, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
249, 250 (1998). A preponderance of the evidence standard only requires that it be
more likely than not that the fact in question is true. See Black's Law Dictionary 1182
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "preponderance of the evidence" as "evidence which is of
greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to
it"); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299, 1300-01, 1310 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Robert Batey, Sentencing Guidelines and Statutory Maximums in
Florida: How Best to Respond to Apprendi, Fla. B.J., Nov. 2000, at 59 (examining the
implications of Apprendi on Florida's sentencing system); Priester, supra note 7 at
250.
9. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
10. Like the previous decisions addressing this issue, Apprendi concerns who the
Constitution requires the trier of critical facts to be and further, what the applicable
burden of persuasion is for those determinations. These cases, however, do not limit
a legislature's ability to create greater criminal punishment for certain components of
crimes. See generally Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355; Underwood, supra note 7 at 1299-
1304.
11. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. For further discussion of the maximum
statutory penalty, see infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text for further discussion about the
Guidelines.
13. See infra notes 206-22, 225-30 and accompanying text.
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arise, as exemplified by Apprendi's application to the determination
of a defendant's Guidelines penalty in cases involving the federal
narcotics statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841.14 Such difficulties would eradicate
any benefits that the Sentencing Guidelines provide in eliminating
disparities between sentences.15
This Note argues, instead, that Apprendi need not invalidate the
Guidelines because the decision does not require juries to make
Guidelines determinations using a reasonable doubt standard.,'
Apprendi should be interpreted narrowly, to permit judges to
continue to use a preponderance of the evidence standard to make
Guidelines sentencing determinations. The validity of such a
conclusion wholly depends on which of two divergent principles
actually underlies the holding.17 A conclusion that Apprendi impacts
the determinations that a judge makes under the Guidelines stems
from the assumption that the Apprendi decision aimed to provide
defendants with heightened protections from judicial fact finding at
sentencing.18 Under this assumption, the Court's holding would be
arbitrary and inequitable unless judicial discretion to make Guidelines
determinations were eliminated entirely.' The decision could not be
applied consistently because judicial discretion continues to be
permitted in a multitude of analogous circumstances and thus mere
wording of statutes would dictate whether a defendant receives the
protections that the Apprendi rule providesu Conversely, Apprendi
would not affect the Guidelines if the Apprendi Court simply meant to
hold that due process requires juries to decide whether the
defendant's acts satisfy the legislatively set definition of a crime.21
When the legislature sets a "maximum penalty," it is arguably defining
a new and separate crime and thus the point at which due process
protections should be triggered. 2 The holding in Apprendi could
therefore apply to determinations that increase the maximum
statutory penalty without affecting determinations made under the
Guidelines. After examining the language of the decision and the
goals advanced by a closely related line of cases, it is more probable
that this second possibility was the Apprendi Court's motivation and
14. Because Apprendi clearly applies to the determination of the statutory penalty
in federal narcotics cases, these problems will inevitably plague such determinations.
See infra note 281 and accompanying text. Problems involving the Guidelines will be
similar because the new procedure that Apprendi commands is simply not suited to
the particular type of determinations that all narcotics statutes require.
15. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
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therefore, courts should limit the scope of Apprendi and decline to
invalidate the Guidelines.
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of the common law
requirement that the prosecution must prove certain facts to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt and describes the case law addressing
legislative restrictions associated with defining the integral parts of a
crime. Part I further examines the varying amount of discretion
granted to sentencing judges over the course of time and the structure
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part II analyzes the decision in
Apprendi and the differing views as to the impact of Apprendi on the
operation of the Guidelines. Part III describes two possible
interpretations of the decision, and argues that courts should adopt
the narrower interpretation that would not require extension of the
Apprendi holding to eliminate judicial discretion in determining
Guidelines ranges. Additionally, Part III also demonstrates how
eliminating judicial discretion would create a multitude of problems,
as exemplified by the procedural difficulties that result from applying
Apprendi to § 841 cases. This Note concludes that Apprendi can be
applied consistently both to determinations that increase the
maximum statutory penalty, and to the Guidelines, without requiring
the invalidation of the Guidelines.
I. ELEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
This part first explains the distinction that American courts have
historically drawn between sentencing factors and elements, and then
examines recent cases that have attempted to define that distinction
more precisely. This part further discusses the varied amount of
discretion that judges have possessed over time and then explains the
structure and operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
A. Sentencing Factors, Elements and Legislative Discretion
The jury's role in determining guilt or innocence in criminal
prosecutions has always been thought to be the most fundamental
aspect of the American judicial system.23 Juries have historically
provided critical protections to defendants, which led to the
incorporation of the right to a jury trial into the Constitution.24 The
Fifth Amendment provides, inter alia, "[n]o person shall be...
23. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 870 (1994). The right to a trial by
jury originally developed in England as a check against the crown and was expressly
provided for in the English Bill of Rights. See Andrew James McFarland, Note,
Lewis v. United States: A Requiem for Aggregation, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1057, 1063
(1997).
24. See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Alschuler, supra note 23, at
870.
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deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," -
while the Sixth Amendment states "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to... trial, by an impartial jury... and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. ''
A criminal jury must use the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
in its deliberations, which means that the fact finder must have an
extremely high level of certainty to return a guilty verdictY The
reasonable doubt standard is so demanding because it reduces the risk
of convictions resting on factual error and ensures that a defendant is
not deprived of his liberty unless the factfinder is certain that the
defendant committed the crime.? A defendant's right to a jury trial,
however, attaches only to "serious" crimes and does not extend to
"petty" offenses.2 9 According to the Supreme Court, any crime that
carries a maximum penalty of greater than six months imprisonment is
sufficiently "serious" to trigger this right.'
Although a defendant is undeniably entitled to have a jury
deliberate using a reasonable doubt standard," only some components
of a trial are subject to those heightened protections.- The jury only
makes determinations about elements of a crime and therefore, the
protection that a jury verdict and the reasonable doubt standard
25. U.S. Const. amend. V.
26. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970). This common law tradition was
constitutionalized in In re Winship. Id. This standard of proof instructs "the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Id. at 370.
The rule "symbolize[s] for society the great significance of a criminal conviction."
Underwood, supra note 7, at 1306. It also reflects "a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let
a guilty man go free." Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan. J., concurring).
28. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); Underwood, supra note
7, at 1306 (noting that the standard directs the fact finder not to render a guilty verdict
if the case is too close to call and the evidence of guilt is not overwhelming).
29. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
30. Blanton v. City of Las Vegas. 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989). Furthermore, a
defendant is not entitled to a jury trial even if crimes that each carry a penalty below
six months imprisonment aggregate to a cumulative potential penalty greater than six
months imprisonment. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 32, 329 (1996). -IThe
deprivation of liberty imposed by imprisonment makes that penalty the best indicator
of whether the legislature considered an offense to be 'petty' or 'serious."' Id. at 326
(quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542).
31. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145 (holding that the trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American system of justice and thus the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial in state criminal prosecutions,
as well as in federal); 9 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
32. See e.g., Joshua S. Bratspies, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Limiting the Ability
of States to Define Elements of an Offense in the Context of Hate Crime Legislation, 30
Seton Hall L. Rev. 893, 900-01 (2000) (discussing the requirement that all facts
"necessary to constitute the crime" be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
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provide depends on how the state defines an element.33 From the
earliest days of the republic no jurisdiction ever considered every
issue of fact in a criminal case to be an element' and no uniform rule
ever existed across jurisdictional lines regarding which components of
a charged crime were defined as elements.35 At early common law,
many jurisdictions defined an element as any factual determination
that would result in an increase of the statutory penalty.36 Other
jurisdictions identified certain findings, such as a finding of
recidivism,37 that were solely for the judge to decide.38
The earliest Supreme Court case addressing the distinction between
sentencing factors and elements merely held that all elements needed
to be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.39 In In re
Winship, the Supreme Court first discussed the standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings." Although common law tradition
required the use of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
proceedings, the Supreme Court had never before held that it was
constitutionality mandated.4" In Winship, the Supreme Court held
that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged."42  Therefore,
although this landmark decision did not squarely involve sentencing, it
effectively approved a diminished standard of proof at sentencing
proceedings. Because Winship required a heightened standard of
proof only for determinations that were charged as part of the crime,
33. See id. at 902; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (noting that
"the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard ... has always been dependent on
how a state defines the offense that is charged in any given case"); Winship on Rough
Waters, supra note 5, at 1095-99; see also supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
34. Underwood, supra note 7, at 1303.
35. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the
State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 299, 310 (2000) (noting
the absence of a consistent role of the judge between different jurisdictions and
periods of history).
36. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2369 (Thomas, J., concurring),
Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. 186, 1 Will. 244 (1804).
37. Punishment for recidivism is punishment for being a repeat offender. See
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998); Black's Law
Dictionary 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "recidivist" as a "habitual criminal").
38. See Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases 225
(Stephen Mitchell ed., 40th ed. 1979); Lester B. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from
Arrest to Appeal 556-65 (1947); Joel Samaha, Fixed Sentences and Judicial Discretion
in Historical Perspective, 15 Wm Mitchell L. Rev. 217, 230 (1989) (discussing the
power of judges at very early common law to exceed the maximum of the crime when
they felt in good faith that it was deserved).
39. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); Note, Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting
Legislative Discretion to Define Criminal Elements And Sentencing Factors, 112 Harv.
L. Rev. 1349, 1351 n.19 (1999) [hereinafter Awaiting The Mikado].
40. Winship, 397 U.S. at 362.
41. See id. at 369.
42. Id.
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any other determinations not structured as part of the crime were not
subjected to this heightened standard of proof. 3
The Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to use only a
preponderance of the evidence standard in determining a defendant's
guilt.4 The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause requires that
proof must be established using the reasonable doubt standard45 and
further stressed that the use of the reasonable doubt standard was
necessary to insure that "the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned."'
Although the Winship Court held that every part of a crime must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it provided no guidance as to what
constitutes a part of a crime.47  As a result, legislatures remained
relatively flexible in selecting the specific elements that comprise a
crime and choosing which determinants could instead be
characterized as sentencing factors." If a legislature desired to restrict
a jury's ability to make certain determinations, the legislature could
readily circumvent the Winship holding by simply classifying that
component of a crime as a sentencing factor, rather than as an
element.49 Therefore, the force of Winship depended on whether a
fact was considered to be an "element" of that crime or merely a
sentencing factor or defense.'
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,1 the Court restricted the power of
legislatures to freely legislate around Winship's requirements. -2 The
Court applied Winship to a statute that allocated the burden of proof
for a component of the crime to the defendant and held that
determinations that are genuinely part of the crime charged must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot be shifted to the
defendant. 3 Indeed, the Court noted that "if Winship were limited to
those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State
could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect
without effecting any substantive change in its law."'  Under
Mullaney, therefore, legislatures were prohibited from shifting the
43. See Priester, supra note 7, at 250; Awaiting the Mikado, supra note 39, at 1353.
44. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Priester, supra note 7, at 250.
45. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
49. See id. (noting that legislatures could circumvent the burden of proof by
redefining elements as affirmative defenses).
50. See id&
51. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
52 Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 698. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of
how such statutory construction could enable legislatures to evade the requirements
of Apprendi.
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burden of proof to the defendant for a fact that is an integral part of a
crime.
Only two years later, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. New
York," and clarified the extent to which Mullaney restricted the
legislature's authority to designate certain parts of a crime as defenses
rather than as elements.56 In Patterson, the Court upheld a New York
State murder statute that allocated to the defendant the burden of
proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress.17
The Patterson Court retreated from Mullaney and rejected the
defendant's contention that the statute's construction violated Due
Process protections. 8 Patterson distinguished Mullaney because, in
Patterson, the affirmative defense was not a fact essential to the
offense charged and the prosecution continued to bear the full burden
of proving all statutory elements of the crime. 9 The Patterson Court
stated that "[tihe Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put [the
State] to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to
disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime."'  Once the
State has proven the statutory elements of the crime, any mitigating
factors may be proven in whatever manner the State desires, including
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving an affirmative
defense.61 Therefore, Patterson effectively redefined the holding in
Mullaney by limiting the prohibition against shifting burdens of proof
to only those facts adjudged to be part of the crime, rather than any
fact affecting culpability. 62  By limiting the protections of the
reasonable doubt rule to only those facts that are encompassed in the
formal definition of the crime, the Patterson Court abandoned the
rationale in Mullaney that the fact's substantive nature governs
whether the rule applies.63 Essentially, Mullaney resolved the issue
55. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
56. Id. at 215-16.
57. See id. at 216; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). The jury in
Patterson was instructed that they were only required to determine the existence of
the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, although they had to
determine guilt of the substantive crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson, 432
U.S. at 200. The lower standard of proof for the affirmative defense was not at issue
because the defendant had a lesser burden in proving it, which did not infringe on his
constitutional rights. See id. at 201. The only disputed point was the shift in burden of
proof for the affirmative defense to the defendant. See id. at 201.
58. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
59. See id. at 202.
60. Id. at 207-08.
61. See id.
62. See Marina Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal Law, 9 Loy. U.
Chi. L.J. 61, 102-11 (1977) (criticizing the inconsistencies between Patterson and
Mullaney); Todd Meadow, Note, Almendarez-Torres v. United States: Constitutional
Limitations on Government's Power to Define Crimes, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1583, 1587-88
(1999).
63. See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 Hastings L.J. 457,470 (1989).
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with a "substance over form" approach, while Patterson reverted to a
form over substance approach.6
Although Patterson recognized that legislatures enjoy broad power
in constructing statutes, the Court explicitly refrained from disturbing
the previously established principle that "the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the
defendant is charged." 65 The Court addressed the possibility that
legislatures could reallocate burdens of proof by labeling some
elements of a crime affirmative defenses, and it qualified its expansive
grant of authority by cautioning that a legislature cannot "'declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime."'' Therefore, the
Patterson Court's primary concern was to ensure that legislatures do
not create a presumption of guilt for a fact, which would shift the
burden of rebutting that presumption to the defendant.' Otherwise,
the legislature retained broad discretion to designate parts of a crime
as elements. 68
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,9 the Court reinforced Patterson,
holding that the legislative definition of elements of an offense are
usually dispositive of which facts the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.7" Additionally, while previous decisions had
indirectly addressed the required burden of proof at sentencing, 7 in
McMillan, the Court explicitly mandated that a preponderance of the
evidence standard adequately protected the defendant's rights at
sentencing.72
McMillan involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act, which required that a mandatory minimum
64. Awaiting the Mikado, supra note 39, at 1352-53.
65. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
66. Id. (quoting McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref., 241 U.S. 79.86 (1916) (holding that
a state cannot, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,
create a statutory presumption of participation in an illegal monopoly)). In
McFarland, Justice Holmes noted that where the legislature creates a statutory
presumption, "[iut is 'essential that there shall be some rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact
from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate."' McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86 (quoting Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. R.
Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910)).
67. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
68. See id.
69. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
70. Id. at 85.
71. See generally Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198, 201 (holding that legislatures were
relatively unconstrained in characterizing facts as either elements or sentencing
factors); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (acknowledging that there are some
constitutional limitations to legislative authority to designate a fact as an element); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,362 (1970) (holding merely that all elements of a crime must
be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
72- McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
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sentence of five years imprisonment be imposed on anyone convicted
of certain enumerated felonies if the judge found by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant "'visibly possessed a firearm'
during the commission of the offense.73 In upholding this provision's
constitutionality, the Court concluded that the language of the statute
evinced the legislature's clear intent for "visible possession" to be a
sentencing factor rather than an element.74 The Court's holding
recognized that the constitutionality of such a provision rests on
legislative intent, and courts should not invalidate a legislature's
decision to pursue "its chosen course in the area of defining crimes
and prescribing penalties."'75
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist approved the
construction of the statute, noting that the statute "gives no
impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."76
This analogy reflects the Court's readiness to permit legislative
flexibility in determining which facts should be sentencing factors,
provided that the defendant is not primarily being punished for a part
of a crime that is guised as a sentencing factor.7 7
In analyzing the legislature's intent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
examined five factors, which subsequently became the basis for a
multifactor test that courts used to evaluate whether a legislature
overstepped its bounds in designating a particular factor to be a
sentencing factor.78 The Court considered whether: (1) the statute
presumed the defendant guilty of any part of the offense;79 (2) the
sentencing factor subjected the defendant to a significant increase in
his sentence;8" (3) the law altered the maximum penalty for the crime
or whether it simply divested the judge of his discretion in applying
that maximum;8" (4) the statute created a separate offense;' and
whether (5) the legislature intentionally constructed the statute in this
73. Id. at 81 (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982)).
74. Id. at 91 (coining the term "sentencing factor").
75. Id. at 86.
76. Id. at 88.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 86-90; see also Bratspies, supra note 32, at 905. Courts used these
criteria to evaluate statutes until the Apprendi decision created the new rule. See infra
note 119 and accompanying text.
79. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86; see also Bratspies, supra note 32, at 905.
80. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88. In McMillan, the Court found that there was
not a great disparity in sentences under the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act because the statute only "ups the ante" by five years. Id.; see also
Bratspies, supra note 32, at 905. Additionally, this case differed from Mullaney
because in McMillan there was no great "'differential in sentencing ranging from a
nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence."' McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87 (quoting
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,700 (1977)).
81. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88; see also Bratspies, supra note 32, at 905.
82. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88; see also Bratspies, supra note 32, at 905.
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manner to attempt to evade the Winship requirements.' In addition,
the Court suggested that factors that have historically been treated as
sentencing factors should remain within the discretion of the judge.'
Although the standard the McMillan Court adopted was greatly
deferential to legislatures, the decision reiterated that legislative
power to define the elements of a crime is not entirely unfettered. 5
The Court, however, recognized that it has never attempted to define
precisely the constitutional limits that legislatures face." The Court
rejected the claim that the legislature's removal of sentencing
discretion through imposition of mandatory minimum sentences
violates due process rights because of the "difficulty fathoming why
the due process calculus would change simply because the legislature
has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with additional guidance."'
It reasoned that mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional
because the defendant does not have a liberty interest in any sentence
imposed below the maximum penalty for the crime.'
In dissent, however, Justice Stevens stated that 'Jilt would demean
the importance of the reasonable-doubt standard-indeed, it would
demean the Constitution itself-if the substance of the standard could
be avoided by nothing more than a legislative declaration that
prohibited conduct is not an 'element' of a crime."'  He did not
believe a constitutional test should turn on legislative intent and
stressed the reasonable doubt standard of proof is required to avoid
"the loss of liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal
conviction."'9  Justice Stevens' dissent in McMillan is noteworthy
because he eventually wrote the majority opinion in Apprendi,
although fifteen years would elapse before he could muster enough
support to turn his dissent into a majority opinion."
83. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88-89; see also Bratspies. supra note 32, at 905.
84. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
247 (1998) (holding that recidivism has historically been a sentencing factor); see also
Jacqueline E. Ross, Unanticipated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into
Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate, 12 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 197 (2000).
85. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87.
86. Id. at 86.
87. Id. at 92.
88. See Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines
Should Meet the Rules, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 299. 320-21 (1994) (arguing that guidelines
sentencing in general should require more stringent fact-finding procedures).
McMillan's validation of mandatory minimums established the constitutional
boundaries in which determinate sentencing guideline schemes could operate. See id.;
see also United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra notes
152-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of determinate sentencing schemes.
89. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (2000).
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B. Recent Case Law Defining Elements and Sentencing Factors
In a recent series of cases, the Court has sought to define the extent
of constitutionally permissible legislative action in designating a
determinant as a sentencing factor.92 These cases effectively constrain
the legislature's discretion to define which acts constitute a crime and
ultimately, which decisions are for a judge to decide and which are
reserved for a jury.93
In 1998, the Supreme Court, in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States,94 upheld a statute empowering the judge, rather than the jury,
to decide whether the defendant was a recidivist, even though it
resulted in an increase of the defendant's sentence above the
maximum allowable under the jury's verdict.95 The Court used very
narrow language to hold that recidivism was a sentencing factor.96
The defendant was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which
makes it illegal to be "found in the United States... after being
deported."'  After the defendant pled guilty to that charge, the
government filed notice alleging that the defendant had previously
been deported due to felony convictions." This fact increased the
statutory maximum sentence because he therefore fell within the
purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 99 Under § 1326(b), the defendant was
exposed to incarceration of up to twenty years, while under § 1326(a)
he would have been subject to a maximum term of only two years
imprisonment."0 The defendant challenged this procedure, and the
Court, relying on the McMillan standard, looked to "the statute's
language, structure, subject matter, context, and history" to determine
that the legislature intended recidivism to be a sentencing factor
rather than an element.'0 1
Justice Scalia's dissent,"°2 however, adopted the principle that would
later emerge in the majority opinion Jones v. United States, and then
92. See id., at 2362-63 (holding that an element is defined as "any fact [other than
prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum"); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6, 244-52 (1999)
(holding that an element may have to be defined as "any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime"). See supra note 112 for
an explanation of the constitutional doubt theory the Jones court used to reach its
decision.
93. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, 244-252.
94. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 230.
97. Id. at 227 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994)).
98. Id. at 227.
99. Id. § 1326(b) punishes the act described in § 1326(a) where the defendant was
deported subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction. § 1326(b).
100. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
101. Id. at 228.
102. Id. at 248-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in Apprendi.1°3 He wrote for the four dissenting Justices04 that it was
"genuinely doubtful whether the Constitution permits a judge ... to
determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence.., a fact that
increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is
subject." 15
In Jones, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a provision
of the federal carjacking statute to permit the judge to impose a
sentence of twenty-five years if he found that the crime involved
"serious bodily injury."10 6 The jury convicted the defendant of a crime
carrying a maximum sentence of only fifteen years, yet the judge's
own findings, using a preponderance of the evidence standard,
increased the sentence beyond that statutory maximum.107 After
thoroughly parsing the statute, the Court concluded that Congress
intended "serious bodily injury" to be an element of the offense and
not merely a sentencing factor.0 ' The Court expressed disbelief that
the legislature would not have intended the dramatic increase in
penalty to carry "the process safeguards that elements of an offense
bring with them for a defendant's benefit."1 9 Thus, Jones could not
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment greater than fifteen years
because the government did not prove the serious bodily injury
allegation to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.110
After reaching its decision through statutory interpretation and
application of the McMillan standard,"' the Court further stated that
"constitutional doubt" would arise if the existence of serious bodily
injury were treated only as a sentencing factor."' The Court
suggested that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." ' The
Court did not adopt this standard, but rather, left it as a theory of
103. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999).
104. The four justices were Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Souter. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228.
105. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-31, 248.
107. See id. at 230-31.
108. Id. at 237-38.
109. Id. at 233.
110. See id. at 251-52.
111. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McMillan
standard.
112. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. "Constitutional doubt" is a statutory interpretation
technique used to avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that grave constitutional
questions would arise. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct.
936, 945 (1999); United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1909). Where a statute is susceptible to two statutory constructions, one of
which raises a question repugnant to the Constitution, the other interpretation should
be adopted. See Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408.
113. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (using the theory of constitutional doubt).
1411
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
constitutional doubt because "prior cases [only] suggest rather than
establish this principle."'' 4
The Court noted a lack of historical evidence supporting any
tradition of unlimited judicial discretion, while some evidence existed
marking a tension between judicial and jury powers.115 The Court
therefore concluded that, at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution, the Framers were more likely concerned about the
latter, which made it more likely that the Sixth Amendment intended
to protect against exclusive judicial fact finding.1 6  The Court
distinguished its earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres merely by
reasoning that recidivism is a traditional sentencing factor."7
In July 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,"8
holding that the Constitution requires that "[o]ther than.., prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'119 The five to four decision"1
was made in the context of New Jersey's Bias Crimes statute, which
required a sentencing judge to impose a greater sentence if he
determined that the crime was motivated by bias.' 2' This principle is
virtually identical to the theory of constitutional doubt expressed in
Jones, except that the Court in Apprendi held that this principle is
constitutionally mandated because it was required by the Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury and the Fifth Amendment due
process clause.122  The Court noted that the Jones holding
114. Id. The Court stressed that this debate in no way "'call[s] into question the
principle that the definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the
legislature."' Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
115. See id. at 244-45.
116. Id. at 244.
117. See id. at 249-50 & n.10. This attempt to distinguish Almendarez-Torres
without overruling it has been unpersuasive even to the staunchest supporters of the
principle expressed in Jones. See Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for
the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1057, 1116 (1999) (commenting that it would have
been much more satisfying if the Jones court had admitted that it "had taken a wrong
turn at Almendarez-Torres") [hereinafter Knoll, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog"].
The article points out that Justice Stevens had earlier stated that "the wrong turn was
taken at McMillan." Id. (citing Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
118. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
119. Id. at 2362-63.
120. Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and Justice
Ginsburg were in the majority. Id. at 2351. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy were in the minority. Id.
121. See id. at 2351-52. The constitutionality of a State's right to prescribe a greater
penalty for a crime that involves "hate" or "bias" was not in question. See id. at 2354;
see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to an enhanced sentence based on the jury's finding that the defendant had
selected his victim based on race). The issue in Apprendi was the adequacy of the
procedure in providing for this greater penalty. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2354.
122. Compare Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, with Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. See
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foreshadowed the Apprendi decision, and concluded "[ilt is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.""' The Court reasoned that
"it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to
the offense are heightened" and "it necessarily follows that the
defendant should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of
those circumstances-be deprived of protections that have, until that
point, unquestionably attached." 124 The Court, thus, eliminated any
need for lower courts to engage in statutory interpretation in deciding
the intent of legislatures, as it created an easily administrable, bright
line rule.12
C. Judicial Discretion at Sentencing
Apprendi has conclusively resolved the ambiguity that existed
regarding the distinction between sentencing factors and elements.
The Court's resolution, however, leaves many situations in which
judges continue to utilize judicial discretion."' Such judicial discretion
has existed since the establishment of the American criminal law
system, and has often thwarted attempts to provide defendants with
the Due Process protections that elements provide.
In some jurisdictions at early common law, a defendant could not
be sentenced to a term in a higher statutory range unless the jury had
returned a verdict on that fact. 27  The defendant, however, was
subjected to unfettered judicial discretion within a wide statutory
range for the facts that the jury had determined.12 Within this vide
range, the judge could impose a sentence based on any criteria he
considered relevant without any checks or accountability on his
discretion. 29 To sentence a defendant at the high end of the statutory
also supra note 112 for a discussion of the theory of constitutional doubt that the
Jones Court utilized to reach its decision.
123. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
124. Id. at 2359.
125. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text for examples of the Court's
prior use of the statutory interpretation of legislative intent.
126. See infra notes 244,248 and accompanying text.
127. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2368-78 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see Samaha,
supra note 38, at 229, 237.
128. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries. *371-72 (1769) (discussing judges'
broad discretion in fixing the amount of the fine and the degree of punishment);
Orfield, supra note 38, at 558.
129. Bowman, supra note 35, at 303 (noting that federal judges could consider
evidence about "the defendant's troubled childhood, arrest record, acquitted conduct,
uncharged conduct, rumored conduct, education, family circumstances, substance
abuse problems-or virtually any other factor that the judge felt to be important");
see also Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2357 n.7 (noting the breadth of judicial discretion over
fines and corporal punishment in misdemeanor cases and specifically mentioning that
it was not uncommon for a sentencing range to be from one year to life
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range, the judge could give weight to a factor that, if statutorily
defined, would carry the protections of an element.130 Legislatures
gave the judge almost plenary power to impose sentences in a wide
statutory range based on undisclosed factors even where juries
determined the existence of the elements of a crime.'31 Thus, by the
late nineteenth century, a defendant's rights were at most only
partially protected in jurisdictions that strictly defined an element.
Traditionally, judges made many determinations in a sentencing
phase subsequent to the trial phase because the sentence "fixes the
amount of the penalty" for the offense.1 32  That division reflected
belief in a "basic distinction between facts bearing on guilt and facts
bearing on the disposition and treatment of the convicted
defendant."'33 In the sentencing phase, judges generally had the aid of
a pre-sentence report, which takes into account the "individual and
social history of the offender, his personality, his mental and moral
characteristics."'" A court's discretion was thought better exercised if
it accepted "affidavits from prosecution and defense in aggravation or
mitigation of the offense."'35 The Court in Williams v. New York136
found that "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics" is highly relevant. 37 Justice was
not considered done unless the judge considered "'more than the
particular acts by which the crime was committed and... [took] into
account the circumstances of the offense together with the character
imprisonment) (citing J. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History 584 (3d ed.
1990)); Tr. of Oral Argument at *4-5, *37 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (No. 99-478)
available at 2000 WL 349724; 4 Blackstone, supra note 128, at *371-72 (noting judges'
broad discretion within a wide sentencing range); Orfield, supra note 38, at 558;
Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 Am J.
Legal Hist. 326, 350 (1982). Even at oral argument in Apprendi, the Court noted that
"it was not uncommon for judges to consider such things as the motive of the crime,
or the lack of remorse." Tr. of Oral Argument at *41, Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (No.
99-478) available at 2000 WL 349724. But see Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2357 (citing
Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in
The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700-1900, 36-37 (A. Schioppa ed. 1987)
(claiming that "the English Trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little
explicit discretion in sentencing ... [t]he Judge was meant simply to impose that
sentence")).
130. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 558; 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Bishop on Criminal
Law § 948 (9th ed. 1923) (discussing the wide sentencing discretion that judges
possessed); 4 Blackstone, supra note 128, at *371-72; Bowman, supra note 35, at 303.
But cf, Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2378 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that judicial
discretion within the bounds of the law is distinct from a judge having the discretion
to actually create a penalty).
131. See Bowman, supra note 35, at 303.
132. Orfield, supra note 38, at 536.
133. Id. at 543-44.
134. Id. at 544.
135. Id. at 550 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305 (N.D. Ill.
1907); State v. Reeder, 60 S.E. 434 (S.C. 1907)).
136. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
137. Id. at 247.
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and propensities of the offender. ' 1- Judges were granted this
discretion at sentencing because of their extensive experience with
criminal cases, which enabled them to deal more fairly and
scientifically with the defendant than the ordinary jury could."'
Additionally, no uniformity existed between sentences that
different judges imposed."4  Some judges tended to impose the
maximum sentence, while others imposed sentences near the
minimum for similar offenses, some penalized certain types of crimes
more severely than others, and some penalized certain races and
nationalities more than others. 4' Legislatures delegated almost
unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine the precise
sentence within the wide range.42 A trial judge was not limited as to
which facts he could consider at sentencing or even in the standard of
evidence he was required to use in evaluating this evidence. 41
During the sentencing phase, judges employed less stringent forms
of the rules of evidence than were guaranteed to a defendant at
trial.'" The sentencing judge's job was "not confined to the narrow
issue of guilt," instead, his task was "to determine the type and extent
of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined" without
regard to evidence rules.145 Furthermore, a judge was not required to
conduct any hearings during the sentencing phase of a trial, provide
the defendant with an opportunity to participate in those hearings, or
divulge the criteria upon which he based his decision.' Therefore,
13& Id. at 248 n.10 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)); see also
1 Bishop, supra note 130 at § 934; Orfield, supra note 38 at 550.
139. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 537. The late nineteenth century Illinois and
Indiana Criminal Codes provide good examples of the wide discretion that judges had
at sentencing. In Illinois, an individual could receive a sentence of anywhere from
fourteen years to life imprisonment, or even death, if found guilty of murder. In
Indiana, an individual could receive anywhere from one to ten years for larceny
involving objects valued greater than $25; or anywhere from one day to five years for
larceny for objects valued less than $25. Id.
140. Id
141. Id.
142. See id; Kate Stith & Josd A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing
Guidelines in the Federal Courts 9 (1998) (discussing the wide discretion that federal
judges have had from "the beginning of the Republic").
143. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 557; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91
(1986). "A judge could impose the greatest sentence available because of mere
suspicion about the defendant, or could impose the maximum in every case no matter
how sympathetic the defendant might be." Priester, supra note 7, at 251-52 (footnotes
omitted).
144. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used to assist him in determining the kind and [the] extent of punishment to
be imposed within limits fixed by law.
Id. at 246.
145. Id. at 247.
146. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967); IVilliams, 337 U.S. at 241, 246
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although a jury may have been required to decide every factor that
would increase the maximum penalty of the crime, the judge's
exercise of unlimited discretion created great uncertainty for
defendants at sentencing and denied citizen participation in making
many of the decisions about the existence of facts that could expose
the defendant to serious punishment.
The sentencing inequities at early common law led to the
development of indeterminate and determinate sentencing schemes. 147
An indeterminate sentencing system provides an extremely broad
sentencing range, but the judgment of parole boards, departments of
correction, or other administrative agencies supplants wide judicial
discretion. 148 Allowing these bodies to determine the actual length of
imprisonment enabled prisoners' rehabilitation to be studied more
carefully.149 Indeterminate sentencing schemes simply replaced the
broad discretion of judges with broad discretion of particular
agencies."' Although indeterminate sentencing schemes were
intended as a major sentencing reform, their own problems prompted
even further sentencing reform, in the shape of determinate
sentencing schemes."'
(1949); see also Bowman, supra note 35, at 303.
147. Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective 6
(Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad, eds. 1997) [hereinafter Sentencing Reform].
148. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 558. See also Sentencing Reform, supra note 147,
at 6 (recognizing that the indeterminate sentencing scheme received its name because
the actual term of imprisonment could not be ascertained at sentencing and parole
boards' officials could not be second-guessed); Bowman, supra note 35, at 301; Recent
Cases, Constitutional Law-Separation of Powers- Constitutionality of Indeterminate
Sentence Acts, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 236 (1911) (discussing cases affirming constitutionality
of indeterminate sentencing schemes).
149. Orfield, supra note 38, at 558; Sentencing Reform, supra note 147, at 6. This
worked on the premise that parole boards would be able to recognize "when
treatment had worked." Id. Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School criticized
indeterminate sentencing schemes because they reduce all sentencing to mere form,
because judges do not actually decide the length of sentence. Roscoe Pound, The
Future of the Criminal Law, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1921) (suggesting that in
indeterminate sentencing schemes, the judge has a very reduced role). In some states,
the benefits of this process were diminished because a judge could set a minimum
term slightly below the legislature's prescribed maximum. Orfield, supra note 38, at
560.
150. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,363,365 (1989); Zerbst v. Kidwell,
304 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1938).
151. Sentencing Reform, supra note 147, at 6 (noting, that in 1975, every
jurisdiction had an indeterminate sentencing scheme but at present, such systems
have fallen into disrepute). Critics argued that indeterminate sentencing schemes
were ineffective because officials almost invariably shortened defendants' sentences
by roughly one third for "good behavior," the incarceration period of prisoners were
sometimes truncated by management and budget concerns and racially biased
officials were able to discriminate against minority offenders with no review
permitted. See id. at 6, 217.
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D. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Indeterminate sentencing systems still led to serious sentencing
disparities between similarly situated defendants because parole
boards and other agencies had unlimited discretion. t-" As a result,
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created
the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission"). 3
The Commission developed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which
were intended to create greater uniformity in sentencing by removing
the unlimited discretion that trial courts previously possessed."" The
Guidelines were hailed as a major sentencing reform because, in
addition to eliminating sentencing disparities, they give enough
predictability to sentencing to allow "realistic projections of [the]
need[] for new prisons and other corrections programs."' 55
The Guidelines achieve this increased uniformity, and thus
sentencing reform, by generating an appropriate sentence for the
judge to impose based on the defendant's offense level and his
criminal history.1 56 The Criminal History Category of the Guidelines
152- See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365; Sentencing Reform, supra note 147, at 7; Ross
Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and tile
Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 lordham L Rev. 1245, 1250
n.52 (2000). Other criticisms of indeterminate sentencing included doubts about
rehabilitative effectiveness of correctional programs and the unreviewability of parole
boards' decisions. See id.
153. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Dispariy, 50 Wash. & Lee L Rev.
63, 87 (1993) (noting that the Commission's primary mission was to reduce
"unwarranted disparity and resulting unfairness in the sentencing of similarly situated
defendants"); Galin, supra note 152, at 1250. In the early 1980s, Minnesota and
Pennsylvania were the first states to introduce sentencing guidelines. Sentencing
Reform, supra note 147, at 8.
154. Sentencing Reform, supra note 147 at 6, 7-8, 12 (noting that at least seventeen
states have adopted sentencing guidelines systems); Galin, supra note 152, at 1250:
Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of tre Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 239, 254 (1999) (explaining that
the Guidelines aimed to reduce unwarranted disparity by replacing discretion with the
centralized decision making of the U.S. Sentencing Commission). Most critics of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines actually favor guided sentencing but are opposed to
the shortcomings of these particular guidelines, particularly because judges do not
have much discretion within the Guidelines. See, eg., Sentencing Reform, supra note
147, at 73 (noting that state sentencing commissions repeatedly rejected the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines model when adopting a sentencing guidelines system); Jos6 A.
Cabranes, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do Wle Go Fronr Here?, 44 St.
Louis U. L. J. 271-72, 275-77 (2000); Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, Building a
Sentencing Reform Agenda: The ABA's New Sentencing Standards, 78 Judicature 189,
189-92 (1995) (noting that when the ABA drafted model sentencing guidelines it used
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an example of how not to construct them).
155. Sentencing Reform, supra note 147, at 8.
156. Most federal circuit courts have held that the judge must make these
determinations using a preponderance of the evidence standard, although in the Third
Circuit a clear and convincing standard governs. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990). See supra note 7 and accompanying text for discussion
about the preponderance of the evidence standard.
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measures the defendant's prior convictions of felonies and
misdemeanors, while the Offense Level measures the seriousness of
the instant crime through the (1) base offense level; (2) specific
offense characteristics; and (3) additional adjustments. 5 7  A judge
applies the Guidelines by finding the intersection on the Sentencing
Table Grid of the appropriate Criminal History Category on the
horizontal axis and the Offense Level on the vertical axis.5" The
intersection designates the number of months in the defendant's
sentencing range within the statutory penalty range for the crime. 59
The judge retains only minimal discretion because he is limited to
imposing a sentence within that narrow sentencing range.' 6°
This Guidelines sentencing range is assigned after the defendant's
statutory range has been determined. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 841
punishes the possession of narcotics with the intent to manufacture or
distribute.'61 The statute provides three sentencing ranges that reflect
different quantities of every type of drug.162 The statute prescribes a
range of zero to twenty years for low quantities of each type of
narcotics; 163 intermediate quantity levels of narcotics carry a minimum
penalty of five years and a maximum penalty of forty years
imprisonment; 64 and the highest quantity levels carry a minimum
penalty of ten years and a maximum penalty of life. 65 The judge, after
determining the appropriate statutory range, determines the
applicable Guidelines range, which requires a more detailed
calculation of the quantity of drugs involved in the transaction. 66
157. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 4 (2000); Bowman, supra note 35,
at 306-07. Additional adjustments are made pursuant to Chapter 3 of the Sentencing
Guidelines and include factors such as the defendant's role in the offense; the
presence of obstruction of justice; the vulnerability of the victim; the existence of
multiple counts of conviction; or the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 3 (2000); Bowman, supra note 35, at 306-07.
158. See Bowman, supra note 35, at 305-06.
159. See id. at 306.
160. A judge may make an upward or downward "departure" from the Guidelines
under extraordinary circumstances. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5k2.0
(2000); Bowman, supra note 35, at 308.
161. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
162. Id. § 841(b).
163. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
164. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
165. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
166. A second, more incremental, calculation of the amount of narcotics involved is
required to ascertain the appropriate Guidelines range. For example, to determine
the statutory range for possession of heroin, a judge must merely determine if the
defendant possessed less than 100 grams, between 100 grams and 1000 grams, or 1
kilogram or more. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b)(1)(A)(i), 841 (b)(1)(B)(i), 841 (b)(1)(C).
To determine the Guidelines range, the judge must determine if the defendant
possessed less than 5 grams, between 5 to 10 grams, 10 to 20, 20 to 40, 40 to 60, 60 to
80, 80 to 100, 100 to 400, 400 to 700,700 grams to 1 kilogram, 1 to 3 kilograms, 3 to 10
kilograms, 10 to 30, or 30 kilograms or more. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1.
[Vol. 691418
2001] ELEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
The Apprendi rule may eradicate the benefits from these advances
in sentencing. The Apprendi Court's bright line rule, that precisely
defined the once amorphous concept of an element,167 may have a
monumental impact on the Guidelines, eliminating significant
attempts at sentencing reform." The next part analyzes the
controversial Apprendi decision and explains why many legal
commentators believe that this decision will necessarily affect the
Guidelines.
II. APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY
American criminal law has always recognized the existence of both
elements and sentencing factors, but until Apprendi, the distinction
between the two was not uniformly defined. 69 This part discusses the
Apprendi Court's derivation of its principle from its previous decisions
and then examines the dissenting opinions' disagreement with that
derivation. This part also discusses the opinions of the dissenters, and
other legal commentators, who believe that the majority opinion will
necessarily affect the Guidelines.
In Apprendi, the Court established that an element is defined as any
fact that increases the maximum statutory penalty for the crime.'"" To
reach its conclusion, the Apprendi majority relied on extensive
historical evidence indicating that trial judges have never been
delegated the power to sentence defendants above the maximum
penalty associated with the crime for which the jury convicted the
defendant.171 Moreover, the Court reasoned that "the maximum" is
important because punishment exceeding the maximum subjects a
defendant to a heightened stigma." The Court explained that the
"relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect"'73 and thus the new
test does not turn on whether the factor subjectively has the
characteristics of an element, but rather, whether it objectively
corresponds to a sentence that surpasses the maximum statutory
sentence.1 74
Notably, the Court also distinguished past decisions.7 Justice
Stevens responded to the dissent's accusations that the Apprendi
167. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
170. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000).
171. Id. at 2359 (explaining that the stigma attached to an offense increases as the
punishment for that offense increases).
172 See id. at 2359. The Court reasoned that its decision should only be concerned
with the statutory maximum because neither a defendant's stigma, nor deprivation of
liberty is increased in any sentence imposed beneath that. See id. at 2363.
173. Id. at 2365.
174. See id.
175. The Court rationalized that Mullaney and McMillan were consistent with this
opinion. See id. at 2360.
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decision overrules McMillan by stating that McMillan was simply
limited to cases where the sentence imposed does not exceed the
maximum.176 The decision in Almarendez-Torres was explained as "at
best an exceptional departure from the historic practice," '177 which was
justified because the additional sentence was based on a prior
commission of a crime which (1) "'does not relate to the commission
of the offense; ' '178 and because (2) recidivism is the most traditional
sentencing factor, one that has always been acceptable for a judge to
decide.'79 The Court admitted that it is possible that "Almendarez-
Torres was incorrectly decided"18 and that if the recidivist issue were
contested, "a logical application of [Apprendi] should apply. 18'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that the
Constitution requires the even more stringent rule that the jury must
decide "[e]ach fact necessary" to increase the defendant's sentence
past the statutory maximum."8 Such a rule would be even broader
than the one that the Court actually adopted because there would be
no special exception for recidivism. While discussing the history of
punishment in America,ls3 Justice Thomas advocated that recidivism
should not receive a special exemption from the rule promulgated in
the case. 1"' He described the majority's creation of an exception for
176. See id. at 2361 n.13; see also supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
177. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361; see also supra notes 94-101 and accompanying
text.
178. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224,244 (1998)).
179. Id. at 2361-62.
180. Id. at 2362.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2369 (Thomas, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2369-78 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas began his historical
overview with post-Civil War cases standing for the proposition that "the common-
law understanding that a fact that is by law the basis for imposing or increasing
punishment is an element." Id. at 2369-70 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. *245, 1804 WL 709 (1804) (holding that the
indictment must allege the value of all of the goods that the defendant was accused of
stealing); Hope v. Commonwealth, 50 Mass. 134 (1845) (holding that the value of the
property alleged to be stolen must be charged in the indictment); Lamed v.
Commonwealth, 53 Mass. 240, 1847 WL 3926 (1847) (holding that the legislature has
created two separate crimes if certain acts are made punishable with greater severity
than others)).
184. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct at 2371-73 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
contended that the common law tradition of the United States has been to treat
recidivism no differently than any other factor that must be proven at trial. See id. at
2372 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Plumbly v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. 413, 1841
WL 3384 (1841) (holding that an increased penalty imposed for a prior conviction
cannot stand unless alleged in the indictment and conviction of the defendant on that
count): Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505, 1854 WL 5131 (1854) (holding that
increased punishment for having a prior conviction is a separate crime that must be
averred in the indictment and proved to a jury)). Justice Thomas also contended that
McMillan began "a revolution in the law" where legislatures actually began to depart
from the common law practice that he described. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2377
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Knoll, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog", supra
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recidivism based on its traditional role as "an error to which [he]
succumbed" to in Almendarez-Torres.ss
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor vigorously criticized the majority's
establishment of a bright line rule. 6 She strenuously disagreed with
the majority's statement that the rule emerged from prior history and
case law,1" pointing out that the Supreme Court had traditionally
avoided establishing a bright line rule for this issue because it was
more prudent to examine each case individually." She also dismissed
the historical evidence purportedly demonstrating that some judges
possessed no sentencing discretion,1 9 by instead presenting evidence
establishing that judges in some jurisdictions had discretion at
common law.190 Justice O'Connor also rejected Justice Thomas'
supposition that the government has traditionally always proven each
element of a crime that had a separate penalty attached to it'' She
pointed out that the support for this proposition actually refers to
circumstances where there was a separate statutory offense with a
separate penalty attached.'-
note 117, at 1060 (arguing that it was only after McMillan was decided that courts
began to treat quantity determinations as sentencing factors in the context of the
federal narcotics laws).
185. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 2380-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Breyer and Justice Kennedy joined in her opinion. See id. at 2380.
187. Id. at 2381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
18& Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728-
29 (1998); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
189. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. See id Justice O'Connor points out that the majority itself acknowledged that
there is conflicting evidence on this point and that Supreme Court decisions have long
legitimized such discretion. See id.; see also supra notes 127.43 and accompanying
text.
191. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2382-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 2381-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority's support for this
proposition consists of two quotations excerpted from J. Archbold, Pleading and
Evidence in Criminal Cases 51, 188 (15th ed. 1862). See id. at 2357-58. The first
quote reads,
"[v]here a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law
felony, if committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the
offence, in order to bring the defendant within that higher degree of
punishment, must expressly charge it to have been committed under those
circumstances, and must state the circumstances with certainty and
precision."
Id. (citing J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 51 (quoting 2 M.
Hale, Pleas of the Crown *170)). The second supporting quotation reads, -upon an
indictment under the statute, the prosecutor prove the felony to have been
committed, but fail in proving it to have been committed under the circumstances
specified in the statute, the defendant shall be convicted of the common-law felony
only." Id. (citing J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 188). Justice
O'Connor contended that the text merely supports the notion that every statutory
determination needs to be charged in the indictment and proven to the jury, which is
distinct from the notion that any fact that would increase the defendant's sentence
needs to be charged in the indictment and proven by a prosecutor. See id. at 2382
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor attacked the evidence
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Furthermore, Justice O'Connor disputed the majority decision's
reliance on Mullaney, because she contended that the concepts the
majority extracted from it are inconsistent with the Patterson decision
issued two years later.193 According to Justice O'Connor, the majority
contended that Mullaney held that any factual determinations
affecting the degree of punishment entitle the defendant to due
process protection of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 94 Justice
O'Connor dismissed this "expansive reading" as having been rejected
by the Patterson Court. The Patterson Court had stated that "[w]e
thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative
countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the
culpability of an accused."' 95 She explained that Patterson and all
subsequent cases understood that Mullaney only held that "'a State
must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by
presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the
offense."" 96
Justice O'Connor expressed further puzzlement that the majority
purported to derive its rule from McMillan because it appeared
evident to her that the Apprendi decision overrules McMillan.
Moreover, she used Walton v. Arizona,98 in support of her argument
against the majority's decision.19 Walton involved a challenge to
Arizona's death penalty procedure.2° Under the Arizona statute, the
trial judge conducted a hearing to determine the existence of certain
statutory aggravating factors as a prerequisite to imposing capital
punishment.20 1 The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the
Constitution requires a jury to make this determination because "'the
Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the
jury.' '2°1 Justice O'Connor reasoned that Walton clearly rejects the
that Justice Thomas used to support his contention that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments codified pre-existing law on this issue. See id. at 2382-83 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). She dismissed this argument because of "its failure to discuss any
historical practice, or to cite any decisions, predating (or contemporary with) the
ratification of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 2383 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2383-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra notes 55-68 and accompanying
text.
194. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2384 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
196. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2384-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson,
432 U.S. at 215); see also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
197. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra notes 69-88
and accompanying text.
198. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
199. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200. Walton, 497 U.S. at 639.
201. See id. at 643-45.
202. Id. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per
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"increase in the maximum penalty" rule "[i]f a state can remove from
the jury a factual determination that makes the difference between
life and death." 3 Justice Thomas claimed that the facts that expose a
convicted defendant to a capital sentence are different from other
facts, but Justice O'Connor found this distinction "difficult to
comprehend." 2°4 As a result, she concluded that prior case law does
not support the majority's constitutionally mandated "increase in the
maximum penalty" rule.205
Additionally, Justice O'Connor noted that the Apprendi rule
promotes meaningless formalism because legislatures can easily
legislate around the rule.2' She explained that a state could alter its
sentencing system to satisfy the majority's rule without changing it
substantively, 7 because a state could set the penalty for a crime at
zero to life in prison and then prescribe that all other factors are
mitigating factors, which would not subject it to the Apprendi
holding. 8
Aside from her disagreement with the Apprendi Court's reasoning,
Justice O'Connor was also concerned that the decision will have
extremely far reaching effects.2' Specifically, she believed that this
opinion threatens the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and all
determinate sentencing schemes.2"0 Additionally, she concluded that
it is implausible that the Constitution requires such a "meaningless
and formalistic" principle, where mere semantics control violations. 2-
She suspected that the constitutional principle underlying the majority
opinion vill require the jury to make every factual determination
affecting a defendant's sentence,2 12 which will have very broad
implications for determinate sentencing schemes. According to
Justice O'Connor, the Court's opinion "halt[s] the current debate on
sentencing reform in its tracks and... invalidate[s] with the stroke of
curiam) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme)).
203. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id
205. 1& at 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. See id
208. Id. Justice O'Connor illustrated her point using the statute in question in
Apprendi as an example. Id. She explained that New Jersey could prescribe a range
of five to twenty years in prison for an offense and then provide that only those
defendants whom a judge finds to have acted with a bias motive can receive over ten
years. Id.; see also Ross, supra note 84, at 201-02 (describing a sentencing scheme to
evade the rule that eventually emerged in Apprendi where all other factors are
mitigating factors). But see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1986)
(warning that a legislature cannot intentionally evade the Winship requirements).
209. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210. Id. See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Guidelines and determinate sentencing schemes.
211. Id. at 2390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 2391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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a pen three decades' worth of nationwide reform. 2 1 3  Specifically,
Justice O'Connor believed that Justice Thomas' concurring opinion
concedes that the rule he sets out would invalidate the Guidelines
because juries would have to decide the existence of every minute fact
that the Guidelines require.214 Indeed, she points to Justice Thomas'
concurrence in which he states that the possibility of the invalidation
of the Guidelines is "a question for another day. 215
She also noted that the majority does not explicitly state whether
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain constitutional, but the
majority's "reasoning strongly suggests that they are not. 2 1 6  The
Court's failure in that regard leaves federal judges "in a state of
limbo," and subsequent sentences handed down under the Guidelines
rest on shaky ground because courts are unsure of whether
determinate schemes are still constitutional.1 7
Justice Breyer's dissent expressed many of the same concerns that
Justice O'Connor discussed.218  His dissent emphasized that "the
rationale that underlies the Court's rule suggests a principle-jury
determination of all sentencing-related facts-that, unless restricted,
threatens the workability of every criminal justice system. '21 9 Justice
Breyer postulated that legislative decisions to create certain statutory
penalties are no different than ones the Sentencing Commission
makes to create Guidelines penalties. 2 0 He therefore suggested that
the majority's reasoning creates serious uncertainty about the
constitutionality of determinate sentencing,"' and indicated that the
Guidelines would have to be invalidated because it would be
unworkable for the jury to determine all facts under the Guidelines.22
213. Id. at 2394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 151-155 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how the introduction of determinate sentencing
schemes was a major sentencing reform.
214. See id. at 2393-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that the
Guidelines may very well be affected because they "'have the force and effect of
laws,"' despite the fact that they were promulgated by an independent body in the
judicial branch and thus the special status that they were granted under Mistretta
would not shield them from the Apprendi rule. See id. 2381 n.11 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369, 380 (rejecting challenges to the
constitutionality of the Guidelines on the grounds of separation of powers and
excessive delegation of legislative powers to the Commission).
216. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2394-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 2396 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this
opinion.
219. Id. at 2402 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 2402 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Justice Breyer acknowledged
that the "present sentencing system is [not] one of 'perfect equity,"' he reasoned that
the majority's rule would provide increased protection at "too high a price." Id. at
2401 (quoting id. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
222. See id. at 2402.
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Thus far, challenges to the constitutionality of the practice of judges
making Guidelines determinations have been unsuccessful.' Courts
have held that Apprendi only applies to those determinations that
increase the defendants' sentence above the statutory maximum. 24
Some courts and commentators, however, continue to question this
point. In Sustache-Rivera v. United States,' the court noted that the
meaning and scope of the Apprendi rule is unclear, and it pointed to
Justice O'Connor's reading of the decision.2-b Legal commentators
have argued that Apprendi invites challenges to the Guidelines
because the majority's reasoning "seem[s] to support the argument
that any factual determination subjecting a defendant to greater
punishment or stigma should be found beyond a reasonable doubt. '
Others have noted that the decision could "jeopardize [the] federal
sentencing guidelines"' and Professor Robert Batey has noted that
there "is considerable dispute over how much of sentencing guidelines
Apprendi has rendered unconstitutional." 9
223. See United States v. Lewis, No. 99-3097SI, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 288 (8th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2001) (deciding that an enhanced Guidelines offense range based on
firearms prosecution does not violate Apprendi because Apprendi only applies to
statutory maximums), United States v. Matin, No. 00-8030, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
197 at *5-6 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (implying that Apprendi is only applicable to
enhancements that increase the penalty above the statutory maximums); United
States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 121-22 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that Apprendi does
not invalidate the Guidelines after holding that a defendant may not receive a
sentencing range above the statutory maximum): Harris v. United States, 119 F. Supp.
2d 458, 463 (D.NJ. 2000) (holding that Apprendi does not render the Guidelines
unconstitutional).
224. See supra note 223. Courts have consistently held that the jury must decide
any fact that increases the statutory maximum. See United States v. Nordby. 225 F.3d
1053, 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating defendant's sentence in a § 841 case because
the judge made the findings to determine the applicable statutory range); United
States v. Pavelcik, No. 99-50316, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20983, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Aug.
11, 2000) (applying Apprendi to statutory determinations made under the mail fraud
through telemarketing statute); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting that the jury must determine the amount of narcotics involved in a § 841
case in determining the statutory penalty): United States v. Henderson, 105 F. Supp.
2d 523, 535 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (requiring that drug quantity determinations to impose
the statutory penalty should be treated as elements of the offense).
225. 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi should not be applied
retroactively).
226. See id. at 15 n.10.
227. Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Supreme Court Addresses Procedural
Issues, Indictment Dismissal, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5. 2000, at 3: see also Lewis J. Liman,
Initial Thoughts On Apprendi v. New Jersey, N.Y. LJ., July 5, 2000, at 3 (recognizing
the broad implications that the decision has for the federal sentencing guidelines);
Wystan M. Ackerman, Note, Precluding Defendants from Relitigating Sentencing
Findings In Subsequent Civil Suits, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 128, 153 n.163 (2001) (noting
that a broad reading of Apprendi would implicate sentencing guidelines systems).
228. Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing, Wash. Post,
July 23, 2000, at Al.
229. Batey, supra note 8, at 57.
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The Apprendi rule may eliminate many of the recent improvements
in sentencing that the Guidelines provide." In fact, the problems that
Apprendi's application to the Guidelines will create may require that
the Guidelines be wholly invalidated, because they may be reduced to
an ineffective sentencing tool. The next part examines how Apprendi
may affect the Guidelines, presents two different interpretations of
the Apprendi decision and argues that the narrower interpretation is
more plausible and desirable. The next part also discusses the
consequences to the Guidelines if courts do indeed apply Apprendi to
the Guidelines.
III. THE INTERPRETATIONS AND EFFECTS OF APPRENDi
This part considers the conceivable tenets underlying the Apprendi
decision, which is critical to ascertaining the proper scope and future
effects of the decision. Although strict application of the language of
Apprendi does not necessitate invalidation of the Guidelines, courts
may take such a step if they perceive the reasoning of the holding to
logically require it. If the Apprendi Court sought to provide
defendants with heightened protections from judicial fact-finding at
sentencing, then the holding would be arbitrary if it did not also
eliminate judicial discretion to make Guidelines determinations. 2 31
Because the Apprendi decision failed to address the full range of
circumstances in which judicial discretion operates, the only resolution
for this deficiency would be to eliminate all judicial discretion. If,
however, the Apprendi rule simply meant to constitutionalize the
requirement that the jury render a verdict for every fact that the
legislature determines defines a new and separate crime, i.e., the
maximum penalty for the crime, then the current procedure for
determining the applicable Guidelines range would remain valid. This
Note argues that the latter possibility is a more plausible, as well as
more desirable, interpretation, which leads to the conclusion that
Apprendi should not invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Furthermore, if courts determine that Apprendi applies to the
operation of the Guidelines, they will encounter substantial
procedural difficulties. This section uses the Guidelines range in a §
841 case as an example of the impracticalities of the procedure that
would result from Apprendi's application and why it is important that
the present Guidelines procedure remain valid.
230. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the reforms
that the Guidelines brought to sentencing.
231. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2394 (2000) (O'Connor. J.,
dissenting); id. at 2397 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. The First Interpretation of Apprendi
Some might read the Apprendi decision to hold that the
Constitution entitles defendants to heightened protections from
judicial fact finding at sentencing. "- Under this interpretation, the
Court's limitation on judicial fact finding only for determinations that
could increase the prescribed maximum penalty would be artificial
because judicial discretion is still permitted in a multitude of
analogous circumstances. For example, judges maintain discretion to
impose a sentence within the Guidelines and in indeterminate and
discretionary sentencing schemes." 3  If the Constitution entitles
defendants to heightened protections at sentencing, then such
protections should extend to every determination that a judge makes
and not just be triggered by "the maximum."' As a practical matter,
after Apprendi, defendants' sentences can still be substantially
increased as a result of findings made by judges, rather than juries,
using merely a preponderance of the evidence standard."  This
interpretation yields the absurd result of continuing to allow judges to
make findings of fact that increase the length of the defendant's
sentence within the prescribed statutory maximum penalty, while they
cannot make decisions that would raise the penalty above the
statutory maximum.
According to the majority in Apprendi, only a sentence imposed
above the maximum increases the stigma associated with the crime. -'
Therefore, the Apprendi holding permits the judge to continue to
make factual determinations that increase the defendant's sentence in
a range below the maximum sentence allowable under the jury's
verdict because the defendant ostensibly has no liberty interest in a
sentence below the statutory maximum.?37 If the defendant's rights
are prejudiced solely because the judge, rather than the jury,
determines the existence of certain facts, however, then his rights
would also be infringed if that determination were made concerning a
fact which increases the sentence, and consequently the stigma, even
when the sentence remains below the statutory maximum. Thus, the
Apprendi principle should logically extend to sentences imposed
232. The dissenters in Apprendi take this position. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2391
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suspected that the decision was
intended to reach "determinate sentencing schemes in which the length of a
defendant's sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual
determinations" and she acknowledged the possibility that this will invalidate the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; see supra notes 209-17, 225-29 and accompanying
text.
233. See supra notes 127-43, 147-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
sentencing schemes.
234. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 2362-63.
236. Id. at 2359; supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
237. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct at 2359.
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below the maximum because the defendant has a liberty interest in
any term of sentence, whether it is imposed above or below the
statutory maximum.
Under this interpretation, the Apprendi holding would also be
captious because of the historical and current prevalence of
indeterminate and discretionary sentencing schemes.23s  In
indeterminate and discretionary sentencing schemes, which have long
been held constitutional-and Apprendi does not declare
unconstitutional-the judge, or even a parole board, makes the same
type of determinations that Apprendi holds unconstitutional. 239 Using
an armed robbery statute as an example, three possible scenarios
could arise:240
1. Discretionary sentencing:2 41 The jury convicts the defendant on
the armed robbery charge. The statutory penalty range for this crime
is zero to twenty years. The judge then takes into account that a
firearm was used in the commission of the crime and imposes a
sentence of fifteen years.
2. Indeterminate sentencing:242 The jury convicts the defendant on
the armed robbery charge. The statutory penalty range for this crime
is zero to twenty years. The parole board has the power to determine
the actual length of the sentence based on, inter alia, such factors as
remorse, rehabilitation etc. during the defendant's imprisonment. It
decides on a sentence of fifteen years.
3. Determinate Guidelines Sentencing:24 3 The jury convicts the
defendant on the armed robbery charge. The statutory penalty range
for this crime is zero to ten years or ten to twenty years if a firearm
was involved. The judge finds that the defendant used a firearm in the
commission of the crime and imposes a sentence of fifteen years
within the range of ten to twenty years.
In all three of these scenarios, the defendant receives identical
sentences through the operation of judicial or administrative
discretion, yet Apprendi now makes it unconstitutional for sentences
to be enhanced above the maximum in only the determinate
238. See supra notes 127-43, 147-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
sentencing schemes.
239. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 558.
240. This argument is distinct from positing that the Apprendi rule can be legislated
around easily through creative drafting, if for example, the legislature fixed the
penalty for every crime at zero to life and made all determinations mitigating factors
to evade the Apprendi principle. See Ross, supra note 84, at 202; supra note 208 and
accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 129-47 and accompanying text for further discussion about
discretionary sentencing.
242. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text for further discussion about
indeterminate sentencing schemes.
243. See supra notes 147, 152-60 and accompanying text for further discussion
about determinate sentencing and specifically, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
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scheme.2' In the third scenario, the determinate scheme, the
defendant cannot be sentenced to fifteen years unless the jury makes
that determination, because the defendant's sentence would be raised
above the statutory maximum of ten years. The only distinction
between these scenarios, however, is that under the determinate
scheme, the legislature has provided guidance as to what facts bear
more on punishment, or are more or less central to a conviction of the
underlying offense.245  There is an intellectual perplexity in
"fathoming why the due process calculus would change simply
because the legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with
additional guidance. ''124  To confine protections against judicial fact
finding solely to those facts increasing the penalty above the
maximum is inexplicably capricious. The defendant has no more of a
liberty interest in the determinate scheme than in the other two
systems and the distinction between the three sentencing systems,
based on mere semantics, "demean[s] the Constitution" by forging a
constitutional principle on a difference without a distinction!4 7
Additionally, the Apprendi Court explicitly continued to allow
judicial fact finding in capital sentencing schemes. -" Following a jury
verdict, some capital sentencing schemes require the judge, rather
than the jury, to determine the existence of specific aggravating
factors to impose a sentence of death. "  In some of those
jurisdictions, judges may impose a sentence of death despite a jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment.- ' The Court reasoned that
these procedures comport with the Apprendi holding because "'a jury
has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which
carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death."'' A judicial
244. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
245. See Tr. of Oral Argument at *4246, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348
(2000) (No. 99-478), available at 2000 WL 349724. But see Frank R. Hermann, 30=-20:
"Understanding" Maximum Sentence Enhancements, 46 Buff. L Rev. 175 (1998)
(urging courts, prior to the Apprendi decision, to adopt "the maximum penalty"
approach).
246. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
247. This phrase was used in id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2366.
249. Id The only actual constitutional limitations on the sentencer are that, to
impose a sentence of death (1) a state must narrow the class of persons that a
sentencer impose the death penalty upon to "reasonably justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder"
and (2) the state must allow sentencers to consider any relevant evidence that might
mitigate the severity of the crime. Charmaine G. Yu & L. Wade Weems, Capital
Punishment, 88 Geo. L.J. 1560, 1565 (2000) (quoting Zant v. Stephens. 462 U.S. 862,
877 (1983)); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982). The Sixth Amendment
does not require that a jury make the findings that are necessary to impose a sentence
of death. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam).
250. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984) (discussing Florida's capital
sentencing procedure).
251. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2366 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224,257 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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decision to impose a death sentence would therefore not violate
Apprendi because death falls within the maximum penalty that the
legislature fixed. 2 This reasoning is fallacious, however, because the
effect on the defendant would be no different from a scenario in
which the statutory penalty is life and the judge then increases the
defendant's sentence past that maximum and imposes a sentence of
death after making certain findings. The distinction between these
procedures is truly formalistic because essentially, the jury has simply
found the defendant guilty of the crime and has left the option of
imposing the death penalty to the judge. Mere wording of the statute
would dictate the availability of the protections that the defendant is
entitled to receive, and in capital punishment jurisprudence,
formalism should arguably be most carefully scrutinized.
To avert arbitrariness, then, the Court's reasoning in Apprendi
would necessarily have to be carried to its extreme and would require
the elimination of all judicial discretion. Legislatures would have to
adopt strict determinate sentencing schemes in which the jury
essentially levies every sentence, which would invalidate the
Guidelines. The Guidelines require judges to determine the existence
of certain facts that place the defendant in a Guidelines range within
the statutory sentencing range, and in many instances, the judge
imposes significant sentencing enhancements that are predicated upon
judicial findings.z3 This judicial discretion would be impermissible if
Apprendi were interpreted as an effort to protect defendants from
judicial fact findingY4
B. The Second Interpretation of Apprendi
Alternatively, the future impact of Apprendi will be far more
limited if the decision is read merely to reflect the constitutional
requirement that the jury render a verdict for every fact that the
legislature determines defines a new and separate crime, rather than
for every determination affecting a defendant's sentence. In other
words, the Apprendi Court may have been solely concerned with
diminishing the jury's role in fact finding that affects the maximum
statutory penalty because the maximum penalty indicates that the
legislature defined a new and separate crime. 5  Under this
interpretation, a fact that would increase the maximum statutory
penalty defines the point at which a "new crime" begins, and is not
252. See id. at 2366 (dictum).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 152-60.
254. See Michael R. Schechter, Note, Sentencing Enhancements Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Punishment Without Proof, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
653, 659 (1992) (advocating, prior to the Apprendi decision, that the Guidelines are
unconstitutional because it violates due process for a judge to punish defendants for
facts of which the fact-finder has not determined the existence).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
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merely a sentencing factor. Therefore, it is only at this point that
Apprendi would require that constitutional protections be triggered.
This interpretation preserves legislative capacity to define offenses
because it simply requires that juries determine whether a defendant's
acts fit within the legislature's definition of a crime. The Court is not
concerned with the length of imprisonment or the maximum penalty
attached to a crime, as long as the jury renders the verdict for any fact
that results in increasing that maximum penalty. -- '
This interpretation can be reconciled with the continued
constitutionality of judicial discretion in determining facts that affect
the length of a sentence in indeterminate and discretionary sentencing
schemes and that fall within the statutory maximum in a determinate
scheme.' The Apprendi principle would only require a jury to make
determinations beyond a reasonable doubt for facts that the
legislature has indicated create a "new crime," so the application of
the rule would not result in inconsistency between indeterminate and
discretionary sentencing schemes and a determinate scheme.
Although the maximum penalty rule would still be formalistic, it
would be meaningfully formalistic because the maximum penalty
would indicate that the legislature intended to create a new and
separate crime. Additionally, the Court's recognition of the continued
validity of certain capital sentencing schemes would not be
inconsistent with the principle enunciated in Apprendi because the
"maximum" penalty would not be simply an arbitrary line because it
signifies the legislature's definition of the crime that carries a sentence
of death. 8
Under this interpretation, the Apprendi principle can be
consistently applied to sentences imposed above the maximum
without requiring the invalidation of the present procedure of
determining Guidelines penalties. The Apprendi rule, by definition,
applies only to those determinations that would subject the defendant
to an increase in the prescribed statutory maximum penalty attached
to the crime for which the jury convicted the defendant." Thus,
Apprendi should not affect judicial determinations regarding the
applicable Guidelines range because Guidelines ranges are within the
statutory penalty range."&I
Substantial evidence suggests that the Apprendi Court did not
intend to protect defendants against all judicial fact finding, but it
instead only intended to constitutionally require the jury to decide
facts that constitute a separate crime, as defined by the legislature.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
257. See supra notes 127-43, 147-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
sentencing schemes.
258. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348. 2366 (2000).
259. See id. at 2362-63.
260. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, Justice Stevens noted in Apprendi that "nothing in [our
country's] history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to
exercise discretion -taking into consideration various factors relating
both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the
range prescribed by statute. '261  Additionally, as the Jones Court
stated, "[lt is not, of course, that anyone today would claim that every
fact with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury; we have
resolved that general issue and have no intention of questioning its
resolution. '262 Eliminating all judicial discretion would be contrary to
traditional American and English jurisprudence and the Court's
resistance toward eliminating this discretion demonstrates its
intentions. 263  These statements are markedly inconsistent with the
view that the Apprendi decision meant to protect defendants from
judicial fact finding at sentencing.26
The line of cases establishing that the right to a jury trial applies
only to "serious" crimes also supports the proposition that the
Apprendi principle should not be extended to Guidelines
determinations. 265 Duncan v. Louisiana26 and Lewis v. United States 67
established that a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial if the
maximum penalty for the alleged crime is less than six months
imprisonment.26 Duncan reasoned that the length of the sentence is
the best indicator of its seriousness. 269 Lewis held that a defendant
who is charged with multiple crimes is not entitled to a jury trial even
if the penalties for the crimes that he is charged with aggregate to
greater than six months imprisonment. 7 ° Under Lewis, the only
relevant constitutional inquiry is the maximum penalty in each
individual case because that maximum indicates the legislature'sjudgment of the character of the offense.271 The rule that emerges
from these decisions therefore focuses on the maximum penalty for
the crime without taking into account the actual length of the
sentence.272 Although the maximum statutory penalty in Lewis may
261. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2358 (emphasis omitted).
262. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999). The Court stated that it was
concerned only with the diminishment of the role of the jury in determining a fact's
existence. See id.
263. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
264. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2358.
265. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 330 (1996).
266. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
267. 518 U.S. 322.
268. Id. at 330; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-61; see also supra notes 29, 31 and
accompanying text.
269. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-61.
270. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 330.
271. Id. at 329-30.
272. See id. at 326; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
1432 [Vol. 69
2001] ELEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
seem to be a meaningless formalistic line, it is actually a significant
indicator of the legislature's judgment of the crime's severity.27
Similarly, the Apprendi holding appears illogical at first glance
because its bright line rule focuses only on the maximum penalty of
the crime without extending to all judicial discretion. That formal
line, however, actually is highly relevant to assessing the character and
severity of the offense. As evident from the Lewis opinion, a formal
line that signifies the judgement of the legislature should not be
extended to circumstances that otherwise would logically be
required.274 The Apprendi rule's focus on legislatively set maximums
should not be dismissed as meaningless formalism or as arbitrary,
because it is actually a conscious reconciliation between the jury's
constitutional role and the legislature's constitutional power to define
crimes.275 The Apprendi rule relies on the statutory maximum to show
where the legislature believed a "new crime" began. Thus, in
Apprendi, the defendant's right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt should not extend to Guidelines determinations because the
statutory maximum establishes a meaningful line.
C. The Difficulties in Applying Apprendi to the Guidelines
If courts do determine, under the first interpretation of the decision,
that Apprendi renders unconstitutional the current procedure for
determining the Guidelines range, they will have two options.-b First,
courts could declare that the Guidelines are unconstitutional because
of the Guidelines' heavy dependence on judge-made findings, even
for minute details.2' It would be very impractical, however, and
would drain judicial resources tremendously, for juries to make
decisions about each diminutive detail that the Guidelines require.-
Second, instead of wholly invalidating the Guidelines, courts could
simply declare that juries must make every determination under the
Guidelines, using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.
This will, however, cause procedural difficulties with many different
Guidelines determinations. In particular, various procedural
difficulties will result from the application of Apprendi to the
determination of the Guidelines range in § 841 cases where juries,
rather than judges, must determine the quantity of narcotics that
defendants possessed.279 This will diminish a defendant's ability to
273. Lewis, 518 U.S at 326.
274. See id.
275. See supra notes 23-38, 55-68 and accompanying text for discussion of
legislative power to define crimes balanced against the jury's role in trials.
276. See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of the first interpretation.
277. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
279. Focusing on Apprendi"s effects on narcotics cases is especially important
because such cases represent a large percentage of both state and federal dockets. See
Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration. 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1863, 1888
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present a credible defense against a prosecutor's allegation that the
defendant possessed a certain quantity of narcotics."' The problems
that a defendant would face in the determination of the Guidelines
range in a § 841 offense are identical to the post-Apprendi problems
that will arise in the determination of the statutory penalty in a § 841
case. 
28
Defendants would generally be reluctant to permit a jury to
determine the amount of narcotics possessed because that issue is
difficult to litigate in the same part of the trial as the possession
charge.' The defendant would have to simultaneously argue that he
is not guilty of narcotics possession, yet at the same time argue that he
had only possessed a certain minimal amount of narcotics.2 3  It is
difficult to claim, "I didn't do it, but if I had, I only possessed this
much." The gravest effect of these conflicting positions is manifest
when introducing evidence to support each of those claims because
the evidence supporting the second claim would necessarily establish
the defendant's guilt on the former claim. Even in instances where
defendants may legitimately contest the quantity of narcotics alleged,
defendants may be forced to forgo their defenses in favor of
contesting the possession charge."8
Defendants may be faced with a choice that violates their
constitutional rights because they are essentially forced to choose
between which constitutionally guaranteed rights to abandon. " In
(1998) (stating that in 1995, drug offenders comprised over 60% of the inmates in
federal prisons and accounted for 74% of the growth in federal prison populations
since 1985); see also Christopher M. Alexander, Note, Indeterminate Sentencing: An
Analyvis of Sentencing in America, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1717, 1724-25 (1997) (discussing
the disproportionately severe sentences imposed upon crack cocaine offenders).
There are over 20,000 federal narcotics convictions annually. Bowman, supra note 35,
at 337.
280. See Ross, supra note 84, at 198-99. For a discussion of other sentencing
determinations that would present similar procedural problems under Apprendi, see
id. at 199.
281. See id. at 198-99. Courts have already determined that Apprendi applies to the
determination of the statutory penalty in a § 841 case and thus it is inevitable that
these problems will arise in that context. See supra note 224. The flaws in both
procedures are similar because § 841 may simply not be suited to the jury
determinations that are required under Apprendi.
282. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729 (1998); Ross, supra note 84, at 199.
Ross discusses other determinations where this simultaneous proof is impossible. She
provides the example of a defendant denying membership in a criminal organization
at trial while mitigating that membership at sentencing. See id.
283. See id.; Tr. of Oral Argument at *21-22, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct.
2348 (2000) (No. 99-478), available at 2000 WL 349724 (The Court asked defendant
petitioner's counsel if he had ever encountered a situation in his legal career in which
he was tempted to argue these inconsistent defenses.).
284. This problem is more severe than simply requiring the introduction of
evidence that is highly prejudicial to the defendant. See Ross, supra note 84, at 198.
Apprendi's application to hate crime laws will require the introduction of such
inflammatory evidence. See id.
285. See id. at 201.
[Vol. 691434
ELEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
Mullaney, the Supreme Court held that it was impermissible to
allocate the burden of proving integral components of a crime to the
defendant because the government maintains the burden of proving
all elements of a crime.' The procedure resulting from Apprendi's
application to § 841 creates a shift in the burden of proof of exactly
the sort that Mullaney held unconstitutional. To avoid introducing
inconsistent defenses, a defendant is forced to present a defense
against the possession charge and ignore the opportunity to dispute
the quantity of narcotics involved. This choice effectively shifts the
burden of proving the quantity involved from the prosecutor to the
defendant because the defendant would be compelled to introduce
evidence on his behalf or else forfeit his right to dispute the
prosecutor's allegation of quantity.' Although under Apprendi
narcotics quantity is treated as an element of a crime, a defendant
cannot practically secure those protections. The defendant is unable
to reap the benefits of the Apprendi protections without relinquishing
his right under Mullaney to have the government prove all elements of
the crime against him. It would not be so strange for a later decision
to conflict with an earlier decision, except that the Apprendi Court
purportedly relied on Mullaney to reach its decision.'
This burden shifting amounts to more than a "tough choice" that a
defendant sometimes must make at trial. For example, a defendant
who goes to trial must perhaps choose whether he has a better chance
of convincing the jury that he was the victim of entrapment or of
mistaken identity. That situation, however, differs considerably from
the choice that a defendant faces under a § 841 offense, because in a
§ 841 case, the defendant must effectively choose between which
charges of a crime he desires to present a defense against, rather than
which of several defenses to introduce. Also, as a result of his trial
strategy, he must accept radically unreliable sentencing findings on
this separate charge.
The flaws inherent in these various procedures may prompt courts
to adopt a bifurcated trial procedure.289 In the initial phase, a jury
would determine the guilt of the defendant on the possession count,
286. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-04 (1975); David A. Nicolaisen, Proof
Issues, 88 Geo. L.J. 1471, 1473 (2000) (noting that "any shifting of the burden of
persuasion must withstand constitutional scrutiny"). Although Patterson limited
Mullaney's holding, Patterson reaffirmed this aspect of Mullaney. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-68.
287. See Ross, supra note 84, at 198.
288. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct 2348,2360 & n.12 (2000).
289. See Ross, supra note 84, at 200. See generally Jennifer M. Granholm & William
J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26
U. Tol. L. Rev. 505, 518-24 (1995) (arguing that motions to bifurcate a trial should
rarely be granted because they force the jury to make decisions based on incomplete
evidence); Verla Seetin Neslund, Comment, The Bifurcated Trial: Is It Used More
Than It Is Useful?, 31 Emory L.i. 441, 444-75 (1982) (discussing the origins and
differing approaches to bifurcated trials).
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and in the second phase, the jury would determine the quantity of
narcotics that the defendant possessed.290 This second phase could be
used to jointly determine the applicable Guidelines and statutory
penalty.29' Even in a second phase, however, the defendant would still
be disadvantaged because he would lack credibility with the jury.2
The defendant would face the same jury that had just convicted him
on the possession charge at the initial trial, which evidently did not
give credence to his defense. In a second phase, he would have even
less credibility because his argument would contradict the defense he
had originally presented. Thus, the jury would likely check whichever
box on a quantity verdict sheet that the prosecution advocated.
To avert such a predicament and insure that juries are aware of the
ramifications of their decisions, courts would have to provide juries
with detailed sentencing information. The jury's decision regarding
quantity would then place the defendant within a very narrow
sentencing range and be very near to actually deciding the defendant's
precise sentence. This might inspire jurors to engage in jury
nullification, where they ignore the law as instructed to them by the
court and decide a case based on their own sense of justice.29
Trial bifurcation will thus undoubtedly increase uncertainties for
defendants because greater compromise will be made during jury
deliberations. Sympathy for defendants will likely cause jurors to be
lenient in arriving at verdicts that would result in harsh sentences,
which could lead them to return a verdict in the quantity phase of the
trial for a lesser quantity than the defendant may have really
possessed.294 In English penal history, the specter of severe sentences
often led to "flat-out acquittals in the face of guilt" and verdicts on
290. See generally People v. Saunders, 853 F.2d 1093, 1095-98 (9th Cir. 1993)
(detailing the California approach to bifurcation).
291. The determination of the quantity possessed for calculation of the Guidelines
penalty would have to be performed in any event for the statutory penalty. More
problems, however, would arise with determining the more incremental Guidelines
penalty. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
292. See Ross, supra note 84, at 200 (noting also, that there may be no
constitutional basis for dividing the fact finding in this manner if the specific factual
determination is indeed an element of the crime).
293. See Alexander, supra note 279, at 1725 (discussing jury nullification in
response to harsh determinate sentencing); Robert M. Grass, Note, Bifurcated Jury
Deliberations in Criminal Rico Trials, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 745, 757 (1989); Racism,
Harsh Sentences Lead to More Jury Nullification, Suggests Law Prof, West's Legal
News, Jan. 26, 1996, available at 1996 WL 258186; see also Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (describing common law origins of jury nullification).
294. "56.7% of all federal drug offenders sentenced in 1998 were first time
offenders while 87.9% of drug cases did not involve weapons." Bowman, supra note
35, at 337. In 1998, the average crack cocaine sentence was over ten years; the
average methamphetamine sentence was over eight years; and the average powder
cocaine sentence was over six and one half years. The length of these sentences was
longer than the average sentence for robbery, which was approximately nine and one
half years; sex abuse, which was six years; assault, which was three and one half years;
and burglary, which was slightly over two years. Id.
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lesser included offenses.295  Once the harsh penalties that are
associated with federal narcotics crimes become evident to jurors,
sympathy may become a major factor during deliberations. An
example of harsh penalties that may become visible to juries, and thus
may affect a jury's deliberations, are the disparate penalties between
crack cocaine and powder cocaine. 96 In some cases, crack cocaine
penalties are over 100 times more severe than those for powder
cocaine.297 A jury could become conscious of this disparity if it was
privy to sentencing information in a case involving defendants charged
with possessing both powder and crack cocaine. After being informed
of the penalties associated with the crime, jurors may hesitate to reach
a verdict that would relegate the defendants to such disparate periods
of incarceration.
On the other hand, in close cases, juries may convict rather than
acquit defendants, because they would have indirect control over the
sentencing and "[w]hen the jury can assess the penalty, they may be
more likely to convict ... since they need have no fear of a higher
penalty fixable by the court."2 98 The jury could convict and then
impose a very low sentence, in effect "splitting the baby." Moreover,
the jury would be determining the defendant's sentence even more
exactly when determining the Guidelines range than when it simply
decides the statutory penalty. Therefore, these problems would be
even more acute in the context of determining a defendant's
Guidelines range.299
Capricious verdicts, resulting from the interjection of jurors'
sympathies into deliberations, would lead to unwarranted sentencing
disparities between similarly situated defendants that would
undermine any parity that the Guidelines have provided." ' From the
inception of the criminal justice system, jurors have not been
entrusted with making actual sentencing decisions precisely because
295. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 245. Blackstone labeled this phenomenon -pious
perjury." Id. (quoting 4 Blackstone supra note 128 at *238-39).
296. See Alexander, supra note 279, at 1724-26 (arguing that a multitude of
problems with indeterminate sentencing schemes have led judges, prosecutors andjuries to attempt to avoid subjecting defendants to harsh penalties). Congress created
stiffer penalties for crack cocaine offenses than for powder cocaine offenses because
crack cocaine is more often associated with violence. See id. at 1737-38 (reasoning
that the media's portrayal of crack cocaine as associated with gang violence
legitimized Congress' disparate punishment schemes and made lawmakers fear that if
they dissented they would be labeled "soft on crime").
297. See id- at 1737. The real world effect of this disparity is that African
Americans receive lengthier sentences than non minorities, for the most part, because
the respective drug users differ in race. See id. at 1730-31 & n.72: Michael Tonry,
Drug Policies Increasing Racial Disparities in U.S. Prisons, reprinted in Sentencing
Reform, supra note 147, at 230, 236-38.
298. Orfield, supra note 38, at 537.
299. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text for discussion of the parity that
the Guidelines were intended to provide.
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of the possibility of these disparities.30 1 Additionally, the judge has
much more experience with sentencing similarly situated
defendants.3° Any benefits that the Sentencing Guidelines provide in
eliminating disparities between sentences would disappear because
indirectly the jury would be imposing the Guidelines. Thus, the effect
of Apprendi, if interpreted broadly, would be to prevent further
advances in sentencing and unnecessarily create greater uncertainty
for defendants.
CONCLUSION
Although the plain language of the Apprendi decision does not
require that the Guidelines be invalidated, a broad interpretation of
the decision's underlying principle would require such drastic action.
The narrower interpretation, however, that the Court did not intend
to invalidate the Guidelines, because it meant only to constitutionalize
the idea that the jury should determine every fact that the legislature
intended to be a separate crime, would make the invalidation of the
Guidelines imprudent. If courts do, however, adopt the broader
approach, and apply Apprendi to the Guidelines, they will encounter
tremendous difficulties in implementing the revised procedure that
Apprendi would require.
301. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 537; supra text accompanying note 139.
302. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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